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Modern technology is being increasingly used on-board 
ships. It is a common opinion that its application has reduced 
seafarers’ workload and improved safety of ships. However, 
human error induced by technology contributes significantly 
to risk in shipping. This paper analyses human and machine 
interaction and demonstrates which elements violate these 
connections. It is for this purpose that the survey has been 
conducted via an anonymous questionnaire among professional 
seafarers. The results indicate that non-standardisation of 
equipment, i.e. the differences in the settings and display 
interfaces between different manufacturers and poor design 
prolong time needed for familiarisation, and in combination 
with short period of handover can contribute to the occurrence 
of human error. Greater involvement of the ship operators in the 
procurement process of navigation equipment is essential, since 
it may lead to the selection of equipment that suits the end users.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In terms of tools and technology, ship’s management 
has changed tremendously during the last few decades, by 
introducing larger ships at greater speed, increased number of 
passengers and volume of cargo, as well as the increased level of 
automation. Technological developments and improved safety 
standards were expected to affirm overall human capacity and 
diminish the occurrence of human error (Turan et al., 2016). 
However, the statistics on maritime accidents has indicated that 
the system is not resilient to human errors (Ćorović and Djurović, 
2013). For example, analyses have shown that human error has 
been the cause of 67 % of accidents reported to European Marine 
Casualty Information Platform (EMCIP) in period from 2011 till 
2014 (EMSA, 2015). Among other latent failures contributing to 
the occurrence of human error, lack of knowledge, inadequate 
tools and equipment, lack of skill, design, lack of information, 
as well as inadequately presented information have been 
recognised. 
As another cause of accidents with a share of 24 % 
equipment failure is stated. Leading contributing factors for 
equipment failure are: maintenance, inadequate tools and 
equipment, design, regulatory activities, and work place 
conditions.  
Managing ship safety is fed both by the knowledge about 
underlying accident factors and general ideas on the managing of 
companies. For better understanding of operators´ contribution 
to accidents we need to understand that they are placed at the 
centre of the work system, surrounded by series of elements 
with which she/he interacts, and each element interacts further 
with others (Carayon et al., 2015). Efficient usage of technology is 
one of the key factors for minimising risk, otherwise vessel and 
cargo loss or damage, along with adverse effects on human and 
environment can happen. 
The aim of our study was to investigate which factors 
could contribute to dysfunctional interaction between operator This work is licensed under
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and technology. For that purpose an anonymous survey was 
conducted among the Masters and officers of the deck. The 
paper begins with an overview of ergonomic principles of the 
integrated bridge system (IBS) design, followed by the influence 
of technology on human element. The results of the survey and 
implications for safety follow.
2. ERGONOMIC PRINCIPLES ON-BOARD VESSELS 
Ergonomics is based on a principle that efficient design 
supports human performance and that ergonomics, as a 
scientific discipline, is not restricted to the aesthetic qualities. 
Ergonomically well-designed operating system or part of 
the equipment takes advantage of humans’ capabilities and 
attenuates the impact of human limitation. At the same time, it 
is necessary to insure that the equipment or the system is fully 
functional, i.e. designed for human use and meets operational 
requirements (IMO, 2001).
The principles of the bridge design, layout of navigation 
systems and navigational equipment and procedures are 
provided by the SOLAS Convention, Chapter V, Article 15 (IMO 
2000a). Further guidance for human element considerations, 
regarding design, layout, and integration of personnel with 
equipment, systems and interfaces are set according to IACS 
recommendations (IACS, 2011, 2013). Product designers 
must integrate all information about operators, tasks, and 
environment to generate an acceptable design. Therefore, 
emphasis should be also on cultural and regional influences on 
personnel’s behavioural patterns and expectations. This includes 
understanding that different cultural meanings with regard to 
colour exist (Madden et al., 2000). Awareness of the possible 
physical differences is necessary, so that the design, layout, and 
orientation of the working environment are adapted for the whole 
range and combinations of crew members. In case that these 
factors are not considered, the workplace design may increase 
the likelihood of human error. Detailed written procedures, 
additional training, operations and maintenance manuals cannot 
adequately compensate for human errors induced by inadequate 
design (IACS, 2011, 2013).
Fulfilling ergonomic requirements (IMO, 2000b) is especially 
important for integrated bridge system, because it is used as 
a control centre of the vessel. The IMO defines an integrated 
bridge system as: “a combination of [technical] systems which 
are interconnected in order to allow centralised access to sensor 
information or command/control from workstations, with the aim 
of increasing safe and efficient ship's management by suitably 
qualified personnel” (IMO, 1996).
The position of instruments and displays must be carefully 
planned because all the processes are monitored and controlled 
from one place. This makes the work easier, but also increases 
the required level of concentration needed for data analysis. 
The concept of work, regarding the duties of operator, includes 
manual control, monitoring, diagnostics of possible failures 
and repairs. Diagnostics and corrections of alarm system are of 
highest priority. Wrong system settings can often be the cause 
of “unnecessary” and “false” alarms. These alarms are recognised 
as ones that endanger the human-machine interaction the most. 
The instruction and maintenance manuals are very important for 
efficient interface running.  Furthermore, it is very important to 
be aware of the limitations, which are typical for each system. 
Monitoring of instruments must be performed continuously 
and interference of the operator is required only in the case of a 
detected system failure. Considering its significance for routine 
and emergency operations, it is crucial to provide the operator 
with an operative and easily used human-machine interface 
(HMI). 
Characteristics of effective HMI design:
- Depiction of process status and values as information, not 
numbers,
- Layout consistent with operator’s model of the process,
- Key Performance Indicators as trends,
- No gratuitous information,
- Grey backgrounds, low contrast,
- Very limited use of colour (for alarming) 
Characteristics of a poor Human Machine Interface design:
- Presentation of raw data as numbers (temperatures, 
pressures, etc.),
- No trends (representation of the complete process flow), 
- Poor interface graphics,
- Bright colours, 3-D shadows (not suitable for night vision),
- colour coding of piping,
- Measurement units in large, bright text,
- Lots of crossing lines,
- Alarm-related colours for non-alarm related elements 
(Gruhn, 2011).
However, despite the existing requirements and guidelines, 
an inadequate design of HMI has been identified as one of the 
factors contributing to adverse situations on- board ships (EMSA, 
2015). 
To be adequate, the design of technology should 
correspond to ‘work as done’ rather than to ‘work as imagined’. 
The challenges to designers come from practical needs which 
are rapidly changing. Furthermore, ship, as safety-critical system, 
represents a unique environment. Therefore, the involvement of 
the operators throughout design and development is necessary. 
Unfortunately, an insufficient collaboration between designers 
and operators has been recognised as one of the constraints in 
the design process (Shorrock and Williams, 2016). 
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3. THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE 
OPERATORS
The role of technology on modern vessels is to make 
planning and problem resolving easier and to enhance safety. 
The technological advances have led to reduction of physical 
work, and contributed to decreased manning. However, 
technology design features can negatively impact two important 
factors for decision making: decision performance (situation 
awareness, threat avoidance, voyage plan monitoring) and 
decision processes (workload, stress, confidence, satisfaction, 
effort, vigilance and fatigue) (Dhami and Grabowski, 2011; 
Hetherington et al., 2006).
The increase in automation level changes the role of the 
seafarer. It detaches the operator from the control process, 
because the operator is not fully aware of all the relevant 
information needed for decision making in emergency 
situations. Furthermore, it is important to stress that the level 
of automation of working processes on modern vessel systems 
is high in demand in terms of human information processing. 
Increased cognitive demands can lead to fatigue and stress and 
consequently to detriment in performance (IMO, 2001). If the 
quantity of information is greater than the operator’s capacity to 
process them, it can affect the time needed for decision making 
and cause a delay in safety-critical decision making.
There is also a risk of relying too much on technological 
systems instead of on traditional navigational skills. Consequently, 
seafarers might forget how to cope with dangerous situations 
if navigation support system is out of use for some reason. 
Furthermore, over-reliance on technology, lack of understanding 
of its limitations and overconfidence in the provided data 
can lead to a false sense of security and wrong perception or 
understanding of external environment (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 
2012). 
Figure 1.
Graphic representation of elements that might cause system performance error.
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Combination of above mentioned factors might result in 
some type of system performance error (Figure 1).
Causes of system performance errors can be divided into 
operator issues and circumstances and technology related issues. 
Operator issues are inadequate training, lack of time for 
familiarising with the equipment and the insufficient previous 
professional experience of the operator. After signing-on 
and taking over the duties, operators personal qualities and 
qualifications for work with the instruments come to expression, 
and those are directly associated with the period needed to get 
acquainted with them. Taking into consideration their qualities 
and required qualifications, a decision on employment is made 
by the Human Resources Department upon completion of testing 
and interviews. The training of seafarers on operating a specific 
system is of a great importance because it is unrealistic to expect 
that, following a short period of familiarising with the equipment 
on-board and with the experiences of their colleagues, they 
will be able to use systems competently. According to STCW 
Convention training is required for following navigational 
equipment:  Radar/Arpa, Global Maritime Distress and Safety 
System (GMDSS) – generic training; – Electronic Chart Display 
Information System (ECDIS) –generic training and familiarisation 
training for the equipment fitted on-board. Additional training 
required is according to vessel type (tanker, passenger), which is 
also generic. 
The period a seafarer needs in order to familiarise himself 
with the vessel, navigation systems and alarm systems on-board 
is of utmost importance to avoid human errors. In practice this 
period ranges from few hours to several days, depending on the 
time of port operations. Another possibility, more favourable 
for the new crew member and for the whole ship management 
system, is the willingness of the company to keep the previous 
operator on-board until the new member of the crew gets 
acquainted with the system. In practice, such cases are rare.
Circumstances and technology related errors arise from 
work environment, inadequate communication (between the 
members of the crew, between the Master and the pilot, vessel 
and vessel, and vessel and VTS), work organisation (adjusting 
the teamwork on modern systems), equipment maintenance 
procedures, and workspace design (navigating bridge). The 
additional problem is a lack of standardisation (Turan et al., 
2016). Namely, although equipment and workspace design are 
stipulated by the IMO and IACS regulations, there is always a place 
for variations. Looking at operating consoles, differences are 
ranging from a “track ball and three buttons” to those who have 
a “full keyboard” for work. In order to adapt for work the operator 
needs a certain amount of time, particularly if he encounters it for 
the first time. A better scenario is if he has already encountered 
the equipment in the past, because in that case he needs less 
time for adjustment. 
4. SURVEY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The authors have conducted an anonymous questionnaire 
survey among seafarers about their experiences with the 
navigational equipment and its impact on their daily work. 
The collected data were analysed with the help of analytics 
software package “Statistica” ver. 13.1., licensed by the Ministry of 
Science, Education, and Sports. Kruskal–Wallis H Test was used to 
determine if there are statistically significant differences between 
variables.
The survey was conducted among participants of the 
training courses, in accredited institutions, including only deck 
officers. A total of 55 respondents met the criteria: 8 Masters, 
23 Chief Officers, 19 Second Officers, and 5 Third Officers. Out 
of 55 respondents, 4 % were between 23 and 26 years old, 31 
% respondents were between 27 and 35 years old, 36 % of 
respondents were between 36 and 41 years old,  25 % were 
between 42 and 52 years old and 4 % respondents were older 
than 50. As regards education respondents reported that 10 of 
them has high school degree, 24 college, 20 university degree 
and 1 PhD. Reported navigating experience of respondents are 
of less than 3 years of in-service experience (5.5 %), 4 -7 years 
(20 %) 8-12 years (32.7 %) and more than 12 years of in-service 
experience (41.8 %). With regard to the number of ships they 
served on, 5 % of respondents have served on less than 3 ships, 
16 % have served on 4-7 ships, 24 % of respondents have served 
on 8-12 ships whereas 55 % have had experience on more than 
12 ships.
The questionnaire consisted of questions concerning 
the time of handover in their companies, the period needed to 
familiarise for taking over the watch, the procedure of shipping 
companies in providing equipment, number of navigational 
equipment (ECDIS, ARPA, AIS) they have had experience with, 
number of types of IBS they have had experience with,  the 
maintenance procedures of the bridge equipment, quality of 
the instruction manuals of equipment they operated, whether 
they have ever been confused by the data on the system display, 
usefulness of navigation systems during watch and frequency of 
fatigue while performing their regular tasks on-board. 
Seafarers’ answers about time of handover in their 
companies (Figure 2), taking into account answers for required 
period of familiarisation to be fully acquainted with equipment, 
indicate that, in some cases, time of handover is not sufficient to 
become completely capable for executing their duties. Namely, 
53 % of respondents have answered that the average time of 
handover lasts up to 10 hours while 62 % claim that they need 
more than one day to familiarise themselves with navigational 
equipment (Figure 3). This leads to conclusion that during certain 
period the vessel is underway without proper supervision. The 
period of handover is limited by time and resource constraints. 
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Table 1.
Relationship between different variables in research.
However, efficiency-thoroughness trade-offs can lead to 
accidents. Therefore it is important that sharp end operators 
communicate with management about this issue.
In order to obtain additional information Spearman rank 
order correlation was performed (Table1). As can be seen from 
the values of Spearman rank order correlation coefficients, 
positive relationships between in-service experience and the 
period of handover, number of ships sailed, and current rank are 
observed, as it could be anticipated. Similarly, there is a positive 
relationship between age and number of ships sailed, current 
position on-board, level of education and the period of handover. 
Seafarers with higher rank navigated more ships. 
An analysis of the period of handover in dependence 
of different variables has shown that second officers report 
statistically significantly shorter time of handover of the Master 
and Chief Officer. This result is expected, considering their duties 
and responsibilities on-board.
An analysis of the relationship between length of 
familiarisation with the navigational equipment with different 
variables show that there are no statistically significant differences 
in the length of familiarisation with regard to the length of the 
sea service, level of education, current position on-board and 
with regard to the number of ships sailed. Therefore, based on 
data obtained in this study it could be concluded that operator´s 
general knowledge and experience are not that much important 
as quality and number of different types of equipment. However, 
a more comprehensive research is needed to increase reliability 
and validity of our findings, and to get a more accurate picture of 
these relationships.
The fact that only 55 % of respondents have answered 
that shipping company always uses the same manufacturer 
Figure 2.
Answers of respondents on average time of handover in 
their companies.
Figure 3.
Answers of respondents on required familiarisation 
period to be fully acquainted with navigational 
equipment for taking over the watch.
VARIABLE
Spearman Rank Order Correlations Coefficients




Education Years of sea 
service
Age „Confusion“ Fatigue
Familiarisation 0,20 0,00 -0,07 -0,08 0,05 0,18 -0,10 0,11
Handover 0,32 -0,72 -0,13 0,41 0,34 0,02 -0,12
No.of ships sailed -0,47 -0,31 0,68 0,46 -0,16 -0,06
Current rank 0,18 -0,65 -0,51 0,01 0,14
Education -0,31 -0,08 0,08 0,15
Years of sea service 0,66 -0,08 -0,18
Age -0,09 -0,14
„Confusion“ -0,12
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(Figure 4) indicates that unstandardized equipment could 
contribute to the prolongation of familiarisation period.
The share of seafarers which have had some type of 
experience with more than one type of navigational equipment 
(89 %) (Figure 5) also shows that problems due to lack of type-
specific knowledge could be present. 
Similarly, out of 76 % respondents who have had experience 
with modern IBS, 68 % have been familiarised with more than 
one type of IBS (Figure 6). These results show that the majority 
of shipping companies in providing navigational bridges and 
navigational equipment cooperates with different manufacturers 
and therefore different workspace and equipment on-board 
vessels are present. These differences pose an additional problem 
to seafarers when performing their tasks and could lead to 
unsafe acts. Therefore, standardisation of important equipment 
on-board vessels is recommended as a preventive measure. 
Furthermore, effective deliverance of type-specific training 
is crucial, taking into account factors which affect learning 
such as cultural differences, authority gradient and different 
understanding of technology by users.
Figure 4.
Answers of respondents about the way companies 
provide ships with navigational equipment.
Figure 6.
Answers of respondents on number of types of IBS they 
have had experience with.
Figure 7.
Answers of respondents about the maintenance 
procedures of the bridge equipment.
Figure 8.
Respondents’ ratings of the instruction manuals of 
equipment they operated.
Figure 5.
Answers of respondents on number of navigational 
equipment (ECDIS, ARPA, AIS) they have had experience 
with.
According to respondents’ answers bridge equipment 
is maintained on regular basis only in 60 % cases (Figure 7). 
Considering its role in safe navigation and importance of 
functioning properly it is potentially a warning data.  
The quality of instruction manuals is an important parameter 
for the evaluation of technology, especially considering the 
complexity of modern systems and shortage of time available 
for grasping it (Figure 8). According to the results, the majority 
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Figure 9.
Answers of respondents whether they have ever been 
confused by data on the system display.
Figure 11.
Answers of respondents on frequency of fatigue while 
performing their regular tasks on board.
Figure 10.
Answers of respondents on the usefulness of navigation 
systems during watch.
of operators finds the quality of instruction manuals satisfying. 
Option "very bad" was not selected by the respondents.
Technology acceptance variables, perceived ease of use and 
usefulness are also significant for safety. Therefore it is important 
to notice that 27 % respondents have been confused by data on 
display (Figure 9). The reasons for confusion were small display, 
too much data, poor graphical display, misunderstanding of 
alarms, and little time provided for the familiarisation with the 
system. 
An analysis of evaluation of HMI with respect to different 
variables has shown that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the evaluation of HMI with regard to the age of the 
respondents, length of the sea service, level of education and 
current position on-board. This result indicates that technology 
characteristics, not operator capabilities, could be reason for 
confusion. This is in accordance with findings by Shorrock and 
Williams (2016) that collaboration between users and designers 
is essential and that it should be stimulated by all interested 
stakeholders. For example, reporting equipment deficiencies by 
operators should be encouraged.   
The dominant rating of technology as useful (Figure 
10) suggests that seafarers perceive usage of technology as 
improvement to decision performance and decision processes. 
However, the fact that 18 % of respondents have answered 
that they could not work without navigation system indicates 
overreliance which could have negative impact on safety. The 
available options "none" and "not very useful" were not selected 
by the respondents.
For ship safety it is important to observe that 15 % of 
respondents always feel fatigued, and 78 % sometimes (Figure 
11). According to our analysis (Table 1) fatigue is not connected 
with the other studied variables, meaning that crew members, 
regardless of rank and age can exhibit detriment while performing 
regular duties. There are many possible reasons including 
inadequate manning, work organisation, time constraints. One 
of the reasons could be that technological development is 
not reconciled with the physical capabilities and limitations of 
operators. The causes of fatigue should be further investigated. 
Finally, it should be noted that our results should be 
interpreted with caution due to the fact that they were obtained 
with a relatively small sample and should be checked on 
larger sample, including participants from different cultures. 
Additionally, there is a potential single source bias. Furthermore, 
the longitudinal research design is desirable to obtain a proper 
assessment of the situation. Taking the aforementioned 
limitations into consideration, this study may present a ground 
for further research.
5. CONCLUSION
Technological processes and level of automation on-board 
vessels, which have advanced during the last decade, have placed 
additional requirements for the smaller crew. Along with changes 
in work organisation, induced by a need for higher efficiency, 
technology could contribute to the occurrence of human error.  
An analysis of marine accidents has revealed a sort of 
system performance error, and the following factors have been 
identified: education and experience of the operator, period of 
familiarisation with navigational equipment, and characteristics 
of man-machine interface.
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A survey among seafarers, conducted by anonymous 
questionnaire method, indicates that almost half of respondents 
encountered a different type of equipment upon embarkation, 
on the ships of their companies. Also, 40 % of respondents stated 
that they had met three or more types of integrated navigation 
bridge during their careers. So many different types of equipment 
have resulted in almost one third of respondents being confused 
by the displayed data at some point. The important information 
is that 40 % of respondents state that navigational equipment is 
being poorly maintained. Of utmost importance is the fact that 
half of the respondents stated period of 2-5 days as needed time 
to adjust to the equipment, in order to be fully prepared to carry 
out their duties, while the period of handover is substantially 
shorter. 
The results of our study show that present situation, as 
viewed by ship operators, offers a possibility for dysfunctional 
interaction between humans and technology.  Experiences and 
attitudes expressed in the survey provide interesting ground for 
further examination of factors influencing usability of technology. 
Since quality of this interaction depends on a range of stakeholders 
(manufacturers, vessel owners, manning companies, regulatory 
bodies, crew), it is important to understand all issues that can 
lead to missteps in order to propose comprehensive preventive 
measures. Therefore, more extended studies on issues related 
to reducing potential adverse impact of the technology on 
ship operators are needed. They should include representatives 
of different stakeholders in order to reduce risk in shipping. If 
confirmed by further research, our results may have practical 
implications regarding necessity to involve ship operators in the 
process of the selection of equipment. 
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